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In order to study the role of money in an inflation targeting regime for monetary 
policy, we compare the interest rate and money as monetary policy instruments. 
Our dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model combines the money-in-the- 
utility-function  approach  with  sticky  prices.  We  allow  for  time-varying 
preferences for real money balances, ie velocity shocks, and stochastic aggregate 
costs in production, ie 'technology shocks'. We show that conditioning the interest 
rate on the expected future cost change can be used to achieve constant inflation or 
constant inflation expectations. The assumed adjustment costs in 'money demand' 
lead to  an  equilibrium in  which inflation  can  be  controlled by  money  growth 
without information on the current state of the economy. Finally, we discuss the 
tradeoff between money and the interest rate as a monetary policy instrument. The 
result depends on the parameter stability of the cost change process relative to that 
of the 'money demand' function. 
Keywords:  monetary  transmission  mechanism,  money-in-the-utility-function 
model, sticky prices, technology shock, monetary policy strategy 
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Tiivistelma 
Tuthmuksessa selvitetaiin rahan  roolia, kun rahapolitiikalla on  suora inflaatio- 
tavoite. Lisiksi vertaillaan rahan maiiraa ja korkoja rahapolitiikan ohjausvalineina. 
Tarkastelukehikkona on dynaamisen raha hyotyfunktiossa-mallin muunnelma, jota 
on  taydennetty yrityssektorin epataydelliseen kilpailuun  perustuvilla  hintajayk- 
kyyksilla. Teknisen kehityksen ja  rahan tuottamien likviditeettipalvelusten vaihte- 
lun oletetaan olevan talouden dynamiikan taustalla. Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, etta 
seka inflaatio etta inflaatio-odotukset voidaan vakauttaa ehdollistamalla korkopaa- 
tokset odotetulle teknisen kehityksen kasvuvauhdille. Lisiksi osoitetaan, etta rahan 
maiiran sopeutumiskustannusten vuoksi inflaatio voidaan vakauttaa myos rahan 
maiiraa hallinnoimalla ja viela ilman tietoa talouden tamanhetkisista hairioista. Sii- 
hen, kannattaako rahapolitiikan ohjausvalineena kayttaa rahan maiiraa vai korkoja, 
vaikuttaa keskeisesti se, osataanko tuleva tekninen kehitys arvioida riittavan tar- 
kasti ja tunnetaanko rahan kysyntaan liittyvat mallin parametrit. 
Asiasanat: rahapolitiikan valittyrnislllekanismi, raha hyotyfunktiossa -malli, hinta- 
jaykkyys, tekninen kehitys, rahapolitiikan strategia 
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Central banks have increasingly argued that only prices are under their control 
in the long run.  Consequently, they should be responsible for price stability, 
ie they should set their policy instrument so as to target the price  level  or 
inflation.  There are, of  course, nuances concerning how to implement such a 
target.  A  number of  countries, eg New  Zealand, the United States, Canada 
and more recently the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Spain and Ireland, 
have  specified  inflation  as the direct  target  of  their policies.  However,  the 
German Bundesbank still uses monetary aggregate as an intermediate target 
while aiming at price stability. 
More recently  (see eg EM1 1997) it has been discussed whether the forth- 
coming European System of Central Banks (ESCB) should conduct direct infla- 
tion targeting or monetary targeting. Without using any explicit model, EM1 
(1997) argues that both are based on the same final objective (price stability), 
both are forward looking, and both employ a wide range of  indicators. 
The purpose  of  this study is  to analyse  inflation  targeting with a  fully 
articulated model.  The model should permit us to discuss the choice of  the 
monetary policy instrument and the information requirements of  instruments 
and the instrument rules. 
EM1  (1997)  defines  inflation  targeting  as  a  monetary  policy  strategy 
whereby the central bank uses an interest rate instrument to directly control 
inflation, ie the approach applied by the countries mentioned above. Monetary 
targeting is defined as the Bundesbank approach whereby money serves as an 
intermediate target; inflation is the ultimate goal of monetary policy and inter- 
est rates are used as an instrument. In this study we use the same definition of 
inflation targeting but we  assume that the money stock can be set at exactly 
the desired level.  Then money stock could be called an instrument rather than 
an intermediate target. 
An instrument is a tool that central bank can directly control.  There are 
no control errors; the instrument variable can for all practical purposes be set 
exactly.  Examples are the monetary base  and the discount rate.  When  an 
instrument  can be set precisely and there is no uncertainty in the model or 
in the parameters, no instrument choice problem exists.  The target can be 
achieved  precisely  with any instrument.  However,  when the model incorpo- 
rates uncertainty, we  face the problem of ordering uncertainty and actions. If 
deviations from the target are possible, the uncertainty must occur after the 
instrument is set. Otherwise the target again can be fully controlled. 
We investigate the instrument rules.  Instrument rules are instrument set- 
tings that are conditional on the state of  the economy and that lead to either 
constant inflation or constant inflation expectations.  The instrument choices 
under consideration are the interest rate and money.  Since Poole (1970), there 
has been a long tradition of  studying the optimal choice of  a monetary pol- 
icy instrument.  We evaluate the instruments with respect  to their ability to 
meet  the inflation or inflation expectations target and with respect  to their 
requirement concerning information on the structure of  economy. 
Inflation targeting means that central bank either wants to restrict inflation 
or  inflation  expectations  to a  certain targeted  level.  Svensson  (1996) calls the latter case inflation forecast targeting.  The difference between these two 
approaches lies  in the information setup:  if  the central bank  observes  the 
current period shocks to the economy, it can control the inflation.  However, if 
it has to move first, ie determine the value of  an instrument before the shocks 
hit, it can fix only the expected inflation rate. 
Despite the short-term nonneutrality of  monetary policy in our model, we 
analyse monetary policy only in the case where the central bank is able to com- 
mit to the announced policy.  Consequently, using the terminology of Svensson 
(1997), we  study the case of  strict inflation targeting. 
The model at hand describes the dynamics between money, interest rates 
and inflation.  We  use the log-linearized version  of  the money-in-the-utility- 
function (MIUF) model augmented with adjustment costs, as in Ripatti (1997), 
to derive the dynamic relationship between  money, prices, consumption and 
interest rates.  Firms' behaviour  is modelled  as in Rotemberg  (1981, 1982), 
where the monopolistic firm faces costs (eg menu costs) when it changes the 
price of  its product.  The demand function faced by the monopolistic firm is 
based  on  a  constant  elasticity of  substitution of  goods.  Our approach is to 
combine the adjustment cost-augmented  MIUF and Rotemberg's sticky price 
model and augment them with stochastic preferences for money and stochastic 
aggregate cost (technology) shocks. The model is analysed in section 2. 
Our choice for introducing money into the economy  is the money-in-the- 
utility-function approach. This approach is also applied by Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(1995), Hairault and Portier (1993) and Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987). An- 
other motivation for the existence money is to introduce the cash-in-advance 
constraint. This was done by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1995), Rotemberg (1987), 
Svensson (1986), Yun (1996), Baba (1997) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996). A 
third route was chosen by King and Wolman (1996), who follow McCallum and 
Goodfriend (1987) by assuming that money shortens shopping time.  Money 
simplifies transactions in the model by  Reinhart  (1992).  Our system is de- 
signed to capture the persistence of money growth by introducing costs in the 
adjustment of  money  holdings.  Carlstrom and Fuerst  (1995) augment their 
model with the constraint that part of  the household's  cash is to be deposited 
into a financial intermediary, which is also a type of  adjustment cost. 
Price rigidity is introduced into our model via menu (adjustment) costs as 
suggested by  Rotemberg (1982).  Other alternatives, which  show up in real 
business  cycles models with price rigidities, include staggered price  changes 
(Calvo 1983) and prefixed  prices  (eg Svensson  1986).  As Rotemberg (1987) 
notes, the first two choices are observationally equivalent.  Price adjustment 
B la Rotemberg (1982) is also used by  Baba (1997) and Rotemberg (1987). 
Hairault and Portier (1993), which follows the MIUF approach, also includes 
quadratic price  adjustment  costs,  while  differing  in detail from  Rotemberg 
(1981). Even though the quadratic adjustment cost approach is easily critized 
(see footnote 7), it is a very simple modelling device and has the advantage of 
yielding log-linear approximation.  Another alternative for a price adjustment 
mechanism would be based on the model by Calvo (1983), where price changes 
are geometrically (discrete case) or exponentially (continuous case) distributed. 
This has been used by Yun  (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford  (1997), Rein- 
hart (1992), Kollmann (1997) and King and Wolman (1996). Svensson (1986) assumes that goods prices are predetermined, ie that they adjust only to the 
lagged state of  the market.  To simplify their  models,  Obstfeld  and Rogoff 
(1995), Obstfeld and Rogoff  (1996) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) as- 
sume that the representative  household  is both consumer -and producer and 
thus include production in the utility function.  This of  course simplifies the 
welfare analysis. They do not need to assume any price rigidities in their mod- 
els and yet  demand has short-run effects.  The seminal paper by  Blanchard 
and Kiyotaki (1987) has uses  a static approach and relies on the assumption 
of  incomplete markets, which has also been critized (see eg Carlton 1996). 
We  also introduce two kinds of  driving forces into our model.  The first 
one, labelled velocity shock, captures the representative household's stochastic 
preferences for real money balances.  It also allows for velocity shocks that are 
independent of  interest rates.  We study how changes in preferences for hold- 
ing money, ie for the liquidity services produced by money, influence computed 
equilibrium. In the spirit of RBC models, we  also introduce a (inverted) tech- 
nology shock into the cost function of  the representative monopolist, calling it 
a cost shock. 
As noted at the end of  section 2, it turns out that we are able to character- 
ize the equilibrium relationship between inflation and expected interest rates 
without knowledge of  'money demand' parameters and velocity shocks.  This 
corresponds to the situation where the central bank has a direct inflation tar- 
get and uses interest rates as its monetary policy instrument. In such a setup, 
money  is recursively  determined by  expected  exogenous  shocks and interest 
rates. 
We  study the feasible interest rate paths, ie the interest rate paths that 
yield finite inflation, in section 3.  This gives us a kind of  benchmark equilib- 
rium.  We continue by  studying more ambitious monetary policies.  We cover 
the cases where the central bank targets either inflation or inflation expecta- 
tions.  As a sufficient condition, we  propose two interest rate rules where the 
interest rate is conditioned on the expected future cost change.  These rules 
are compared to the classical rule whereby the interest rate is conditioned on 
current inflation.  The main lessons from this exercise is that inflation cannot 
be stabilized without considering cost-change expectations. 
A novel feature of  our model is that we are able to ascribe a role to money. 
The role arises from the adjustment costs. Due to the adjustment costs, money 
growth captures the expectations for future interest rates and cost changes.  We 
get an equilibrium in which money is the only current determinant of inflation. 
Consequently we are able to  propose a money rule, where money is conditioned 
on period t -  1 state variables, ie variables that the central bank can observe. 
In order to utilize this framework the central bank must know more of  the 
parameters of  the model. 
Finally, in the last section, we discuss the choice of  monetary policy strat- 
egy,  which  in our case is  the choice  of  a  monetary policy  instrument.  We 
conclude that it is a highly empirical question whether money or an interest 
rate should be used as a monetary policy instrument. 2  A  Model  with  Sticky  Money  and  Sticky 
Prices 
Although Lucas (1988) prefers to base the 'money demand model', or rather 
the relationship between money, consumption and interest rates, on the cash- 
in-advance constraint, we  have chosen to include real balances directly in the 
utility  function.  Other options modelling the demand for  money  would  be 
transactions  costs  and shopping time models.  However,  the money-in-the- 
utility-function (MIUF) has the advantage of  analytical simplicity and it allows 
us to illustrate the dynamics of  the relationship. 
The strong persistence1 of  nominal balances and its growth rate suggests 
that changes in nominal balances involve adjustment costs.  Consequently, we 
augment the usual MIUF model with adjustment costs for changing money 
holdings.  Adjustment  costs for changing money holdings is somewhat  artifi- 
cial since money should be the asset that is most cheaply exchanged. On the 
other hand, one can imagine that there are costs involved in adjusting eg bank 
accounts2, ie shoe sole costs.  However, we believe that adjustment costs com- 
prise an approximate modelling device for incorporating dynamics in 'money 
demand' analysis. On the aggregate level they could, for example, mimic more 
complex dynamics, eg (s,  S)  behaviour.  The MIUF model is derived in section 
2.1. 
The motivation of  modelling prices  as sticky also relates to the empirical 
argument that inflation seems to be so persistent that it could even be approx- 
imated by an integrated processes.  In addition to price stickiness, we  assume 
monopolistic competition, in order to  introduce demand effects into our model. 
The Euler equation expressing the model's supply characteristics is introduced 
in section 2.3. 
Since the purpose of  the model is to analyze the choice of  monetary policy 
and to estimate the model parameters, we  linearize the model3.  We mainly 
utilize the first  order Taylor approximation around the -  hopefully cointe- 
grated and thus stationary -  steady state. The loglinearization is separated 
in  section 2.2.  Although the model is not  entirely classical, its steady state 
properties are very classical. The steady state is examined in section 2.4.  Sec- 
tion 2.5 discusses possible equilibria and we leave most of  the monetary policy 
issues to section 3. 
2.1  Household Preferences 
The economy is inhabited by infinitely lived households, firms and the mon- 
etary authority (central bank). It also includes a continuum of  differentiated 
goods that are produced by monopolistically competitive firms. The firms and 
goods are indexed by  x E  [0, I]. The differentiated goods are aggregated to 
produce a single composite good, which yields utility to the household. 
'See  the  extensive  literature  on  demand  for  money  studies  based  on  cointegration 
techniques. 
'Bank  accounts are usually at least partly incorporated in money measures. 
3The estimation and testing theory for models with (possibly) nonstationary variables is 
fairly well established for linear models. The household optimizes the discounted sum of  expected utility from con- 
sumption and real money balances: 
03 
max EO  [u(ct) +  3tv ($)I 
t=O 
The household allocates its 'phantom' income y (ie periodic exogenous endow- 
ment) and other earnings among (composite) consumption (Ct: real value of 
consumption), bonds  (Bt: real value of  bonds denominated in units of  time 
t consumption) which pay a gross real return of  1 + rt (from time t to time 
t + 1),  and real money balances, E,  which pay a gross return *.  Whenever 
it adjusts its money balances between period t -  1 and period t, the household 
suffers losses  amounting in real terms to a(Mt,  Mt-1, Mte2)/Pt.  The house- 
hold's budget constraint is 
We  also  assume that the period  utility  obtained from  consuption  and real 
money balances are concave, ie uf(.) > 0, u1I(.) < 0, vl(.) > 0 and vl'(.) < 0. 
Ct is the number of  units of  the composite good available at period t: 
where 8 > 1 is the constant elasticity of  substitution (CES). The price defla- 
tor for nominal money balances is the consumption-based  money price index 
implicit in (2). It is obtained as a solution of  the cost minimization problem 
subject to the aggregator (2): 
Note that the utility function is additive and the weight of  utility gained by 
the representative household from the real money balances is stochastic. Since 
we  utilize the representative household  approach it is quite natural to allow 
real money balances to yield stochastic liquidity services.  Consequently,  the 
stochastic variable St is introduced to allow for stochastic transaction technol- 
ogy.  Another way  of  interpretating this is that the velocity shock allows for 
changes of  time in the heterogeneity of  households.  Stochastic preferences for 
liquidity services yielded by money can be motivated so as to allow for shocks 
to money demand -  or to velocity -  that are independent of monetary policy. 
Hence, velocity cannot be controlled via monetary policy. 
When we  iterate the budget constraint, we obtain the following transver- 
sality condition: This states that the present  value of  financial assets held in period T  (real 
bonds and money) tends to zero as time T tends to infinity. That is to say the 
financial assets' expected growth is restricted to be below the real rate, r. 
The first-order conditions for bonds and real money balances are 
We  assume that a nominal bond exists in our economy. The condition (5) for 
the nominal bond is given by 
If  we  combine the additional assumption that 
with the equation (7), the condition (6) for nominal money can be written as 
where It E  1 + it.  The covariance condition holds for example if  consumers 
are risk neutral and inflation is deterministic or if  the net own-yield of  money, 
1 -  a',,  (Mt+l,  Mt, Mt-,),  is deterministic. The left-hand side of  equation (9) is 
the marginal rate of  substitution of  consumption for real balances.  The right 
hand side is the rental cost, in terms of  the consumption good, of  holding an 
extra unit of  real balances  for one period.  Note  that the rental cost differs 
from the usual 1 -  l/It.  With quadratic adjustment costs, for example, the 
model might yield multiple equilibria. 
Assumption 1  (Utility function and adjustment costs). Next  we  pa- 
rameterize the utility function to the CRRA form as 
and the adjustment cost function a(-)  as follows: 
where K and v are adjustment cost parameters. The adjustment cost function expresses the notion that it is changes in the 
growth rate of  money that affect costs, not the growth rate itself, as is typical 
(eg  Cuthbertson and Taylor 1987, Cuthbertson and Taylor 1990). However, if 
the parameter v is zero, the adjustment cost function is the typical one.  Th 
chosen functional form allows for persistence not only in the level of  money 
balances but also in the growth rate of  money4. Its motivation relies on our 
empirical experience with Finnish monetary aggregates. It is however difficult 
to connect these parameters to any spesific payment technology. 
From (9) one obtains 
-  1  St 
n[(l + v)v +  ~t]  (It  -  I) + ,$[(I  + v)v +  1~1 
I  ()  (11) 
The household's problem also implies the following transversality conditions: 
The first condition (12) states that the expected real money balances cannot 
grow with a rate faster than (1 -  w)/6.  Correspondingly, the condition (13) 
states that the consumption growth rate cannot exceed (1 -  p)/6.  This means 
that exactly all the household's resources are exhausted as t approaches infinity. 
2.2  Loglinear Approximat  ion 
In order to loglinearize equation (ll),  we find the steady state for equation (11) 
and then use the first-order Taylor approximation around the steady state. For 
the steady state, the adjustment costs are zero and Ct = C, It = I, It = I, 
Mt  = M  ('it  2  0).  We  denote logarithmic variables  in the lower  case  (eg 
logC = c) and I -  1  + i.  Note that i % log(1 +  i) and Ct E  log(&).  In the 
steady state, equation (11) reduces to 
which  resembles the standard demand for money function.  From the first- 
order Taylor approximation around the (log of) the steady state, we  obtain 
the following log-linear Euler equation: 
Assumption 2.  For simplicity, we assume quadratic adjustment costs, ie v = 
0. 
4~ipatti  (1994) discusses on the possibility of  two unit roots in the M1 and M2 series. This simplifies the algebra but still illustrate the dynamics involved in the 
demand for money.  The Euler equation (15) can be written as 
The parameterized version of  Euler equation (7) is 
The right-hand side contains the conditional expectation for a nonlinear func- 
tion of  random future consumption. Therefore, because of  Jensen's inequality, 
a first-order Taylor series approximation is inadequate.  The second-order Tay- 
lor approximation of Euler equation (17) gives us 
= 6 exp  Et  [log(l +  it) -  A log Pt+l -  p log Ct+l+ p log Ct]  i 
Taking logs of  both sides yields 
ct+l  where  it  iog(1 + it) a  =  a  1 +  it)  ( a )  *)I  (which is 
-  P 
assumed to be constant). This approximation is exact if  (1 +  it) 2  (9) 
is lognormally distributed. 
Therefore, the loglinearized Euler equation is 
Our  assumption  of  a  constant  conditional covariance might  be misleading. 
Modelling of  the variance term is nowadays an important field of  research in 
consumption-based asset pricing theory. 
2.3  Monopolistic Firms 
We  assume monopolistic  competition5 in order to introduce demand effects 
into our model.  In tracking the price stickiness, we  follow Rotemberg (1981) 
5See Carlton  (1996)  for  a  critical  assesment  of  the role  of  imperfect  competition  in 
macromodels. except that we  use the demand function derived from equation (11). Another 
widely6 used representation is Calvo (1983). He obtains observationally sim- 
ilar aggregate price dynamics in a  setting in which individual firms have an 
exogenous probability of  being permitted to change the price in a given period 
(Rotemberg 1987). 
Each monopolistic firm produces a distinct nonstorable good. The number 
of  monopolistic firms is large and each individual firm produces such a small 
part  of  the aggregate  that it need  not  take into account  the effects of  its 
production and pricing decisions on aggregate prices or demand. 
Household consumption, Ct, is a real consumption index.  Assuming CES 
preferences  for consumption goods, a monopolistic firm faces a demand func- 
tion of  the form 
where  Ct(z) is  the quantity  of  good z  demanded  at  time t, which  ca,n be 
obtained from equation (11). A(z) is a firm-specific constant, Pt(z)  is the price 
of  good x at time t and Pt the general price level.  The quantity demanded of 
any particular good depends not only on the relative price of the good but also 
the aggregate real consumption. 
Each monopolist's cost function is quadratic: 
The cost of  producing the quantity Ct (x) at time t is K(Ct  (z),  z). U(z) is a 
firm-specific, small and positive parameter. The production function contains 
an aggregate stochastic technology parameter, Tt. Positive changes in T reflect 
increasing costs.  Hence, it is a inverse of  technology  or productivity shock. 
We call it a cost shock.  In the spirit of  real business cycle models, we believe 
that technology shocks are a key driving force in economic fluctuations. With- 
out shocks, the model converges  to a balanced  growth path and then grows 
smoothly.  In standard real business  cycle models with the cash-in-advance 
constraint, like Cooley  and Hansen  (1989), the optimal policy  makes no at- 
tempt to respond to technology shocks. In models with nominal rigidities, like 
Cho and Cooley  (1995) and Yun  (1996), nominal shocks affect  the business 
cycle as well, and it is important to take the technology  shock into account 
in designing optimal monetary policy.  Ireland (1997) shows how a technology 
shock influences the optimal monetary policy in a model of  sticky prices. 
Since we  assume a large number of  monopolistic firms, ie that the economy 
is  atomistic, the aggregate price level and aggregate consumption  are given 
for each monopolistic firm.  Hence, the monopolistic firm maximizes nominal 
profits with respect to the price of its good, P,(x) 
'See  eg Yun (1996), Rotemberg and Woodford (1997),  Reinhart (1992), Kollmann (1997) 
and King and Wolman (1996). The first-order condition for maximization requires that Pt(x)  is equal to  Pt(x)*, 
where 
The first factor, 0/(8 -  1))  is the firm's markup.  The higher the value of  0, 
the smaller the markup and the less the firm's monopoly power.  The limiting 
case, 0 +  oo, corresponds to perfect competition. The profit maximizing price 
level, P(x),  is the same for nominal and real profits since the individual firm's 
price setting does not influence the aggregate price, ie dPt/dPt(x) = 0. 
Rotemberg (1981) derives the second-order Taylor approximation for profits 
around Pt(x)*  and assumes that the monopolistic firm faces costs of  changing 
prices7. The monopolist's problem can then be approximated by 
The first-order condition is 
where a lowercase letter denotes the logarithm of  the variable denoted by the 
corresponding uppercase letter and rt = log Tt. Note that the time preference 
parameter, 6, is the same for consumers and producers.  The current change 
in the price of  product x is determined by the optimal (in the absence of  ad- 
justment  costs) price level rise compared to the present level and the expected 
future level. Due to the adjustment costs in changing price, the firm must take 
into account the expected future optimal prices. 
The maximization problem also involves a transversality condition: 
In the aggregation we  utilize the demand function faced  by  the firm.  The 
aggregated8 version of  equation (22) is 
7Arguments for the costs in changing prices can be  classified into two categories  (see 
eg Barro (1972) and Sheshinski and Weiss (1977)): administrative and similar costs (menu 
costs; see Levy, Bergen, Dutta and Venable  (1997) for empirical relevance)  and costs due 
to unfavourable reactions by customers. Rotemberg (1987) illustrates that increasing prices 
could,  for  example, upset  customers.  However,  the quadratic adjustment cost  approach 
assumes symmetry in the costs of raising or lowering prices. Prescott (1987, page 113) critizes 
the menu cost approach:"I have no answer to the question of  how to measure these menu 
change costs, but these theories will never be taken seriously until an answer is provided". 
Nevertheless,  we  treat the assumption of  the menu  costs as merely  a  simplifying device 
to introduce price inflexibility into our model.  On a more fundamental level, the problem 
remains as to how to explain the apparently significant costs of  changing prices. 
*In the aggregation we  approximate the CES  consumption price index with a  Cobb- 
Douglas price index using the weights h(z).  In the limiting case, 8 + 1, the approximation 
is exact. where S = J:  &h(r) [log (&)  + ~(z)  +  a(z)]  dz and D I  &.  Let  X denote 
the stable root of the corresponding characteristic equation  +  1 = X + i.  The 
Euler equation (24))  in the first difference form, is 
It is also assumed that all monopolistic firms have homogenous expectations 
about all the random variables in the system, ie about ct and rt. Consequently, 
the forward solution is 
or in difference form 
According  to the solution, the firms must consider the past price level  and 
forecast  the future aggregate demand as well as the cost  shocks in order to 
determine its current price level.  The aggregate demand links the consump- 
tion decision of  the representative  household and the pricing decision of  the 
monopolistic firm. 
The quadratic  adjustment  cost  approach  has the advantage  of  yielding 
equations that can be easily  estimated.  Calvo's  approach shares this qual- 
ity.  The drawback of  the model is that the adjustment cost parameter is fixed; 
even in a regime of  large and sudden increases in aggregate demand the prices 
adjust rather slowly.  In Calvo's model, individual price changes can be large 
while  the price  level  adjusts sluggishly.  There is also  a  mapping from the 
adjustment  cost  parameter of  the present  model to the probability of  price 
changes in Calvo's model. 
Another  implicit  assumption  concerning  the  adjustment  costs  of  price 
changes  is the symmetry and state-independence  of  the cost  parameter,  d. 
There is however only weak evidence of  asymmetries in the GDP (Hess and 
Iwata 1997).  State-independence in possibly  a more restrictive assumption. 
For example, it might be the case that in a high inflation regime the adjust- 
ment costs are larger than in the case of  a low inflation regime. 
2.4  Steady State 
To construct the steady state and to derive the equilibrium, we write our Euler 
equations as 
S  D  [L-l - (j + 1)  + ;L] Etpt = --  d6 -  -Et(4+rt),  dS where L-jEtxt = Etxt+j. Utilizing equations (27)-(29)  and the steady state 
relationship (14), we  obtain steady state solutions by letting L = 1. We  use 
'bar'  notation for steady state values for each variable.  The steady state is 
determined by the following equations: 
C 
- 
i = -  log 6  and  (31) 
The steady state properties of  the model are quite classical.  The steady 
state consumption level is determined by  supply factors, ie the steady state 
cost  shocks and the aggregated  parameters of  the cost  function of  the mo- 
nopolistic firm.  Since there is no inflation in the steady state, the nominal 
interest rate equals the real rate of interest.  Since the conditional covariance, 
v, is  zero  in the steady state, the real  and nominal rate equals  116 -  1, ie 
the degree of  time preference.  As in any classical model, the price level is left 
undetermined. However, the real balances are determined by the steady state 
cost and preference  shocks and all the other parameters of  the model.  If  the 
money  stock is given, the price level is determinated by  the model and vice 
versa.  The higher the average costs, the lower the real money balances.  The 
more weight that households give to  real money balances, ie the more liquidity 
services money yield, the higher the steady state level of  real money balances. 
The steady state also corresponds to the temporal equilibrium of  the model in 
the situation where the adjustment costs for both money and prices are zero. 
2.5  Equilibrium 
03  An equilibrium is a set of  stochastic processes {mt,  pt, ct),=,  satisfying equilib- 
rium conditions (15), (18) and (24), given m-1,  m-2,  m-3,  p-1,  p-2,  C-1,  C-2 
and {it, rt ,  5t  )to"=,, 
First we  combine the Euler equations  (18) and (24) in order to solve for 
inflation and consumption growth.  We  discuss  the possible  equilibria  that 
these equations yield.  The solution for money can then be obtained by using 
the solutions for inflation and consumption growth.  Equilibrium consumption 
is characterized by the following equation: 
1 
(log 6 +  v +  it+j) 
where  \Ap\ > 1  is one of the rootsg of  + -& =  X + &. Clearly the dynamic 
sollulion lo the consumption displays saddle path dynamics; current consump- 
'~t  can be shown that the roots are IApl  > 1 and  1 l/(SAp)  1  < 1. 
18 tion depends on past consumption as well as on the entire anticipated future 
path of interest rates and cost changes. This property of  a rational expectations 
solution is general and shows up in many types of  rational expectations mod- 
els. Past interest rates have a positive effect on current consumption, whereas 
present and future interest rates affect it negatively.  The term & (1 -  &) 
has a positive sign. This is a reflection of  the familiar consumption smoothing 
behaviour of  households under well-functioning capital markets. 
The dynamic relationship between  inflation and interest  rates is not  as 
straightforward  as the relationship between  consumption  and interest  rates. 
As above, we  combine the Euler equations (18) and (24) and, then, substitute 
for consumption; yielding 
D  -- 
d6P 
[it + (log S +  v) +  pEJrt+l]  .  (34) 
The characteristic equation is as above.  Then we solve forwardly the unstable 
root, A,: 
Note however  that we  still have  the stable root, 16Xp1  > 1.  This is  a  well 
known problem in macroeconomic models where the 'IS function' contains an 
expected  endogenous variable  (see eg Kerr  and King (1996) and references 
therein). The maibn point here is that the future inflation has a greater than 
one-for-one effect on current inflation. We  discuss two possible candidates for 
equilibria. 
'With the first candidate, the solution displays saddle-path dynamics and 
can be written explicitely as 
This solution however yields a positive relationship between future interest rates 
and inflation.  Increases for example in the current nominal interest rate while 
keeping the path of  (anticipated) future interest rates constant increase current 
inflation.  Whereas it is well known  that rational expectations solutions can 
display non-standard dynamics in certain model typeslo, we  conjencture that 
in  the present  context this 'perverse'  dynamic relationship  reflects  unstable 
dynamics. 
''See  eg the (overlapping generations) model of inflation analyzed by Sargent (1993),  where 
increased government deficits reduce inflation in a stable rational expectations equilibrium. 
The reason is that the economy finds itself  in the wrong side of  the 'Laffer'  curve in the 
inflation tax rate. The second candidate for the forward solution of  (35) clarifies the feasibility 
of  the possible choices of  interest rate paths. We  iterate it T periods forward: 
x (it+j  +  log 6 +  v + pArt+l+j)  + (6~p)~"  EtApt+~+i.  (36)  1 
The dynamics of  the equilibrium inflation has Wicksellian features.  Any in- 
terest  rate peg which  sufficiently  differs from the degree of  time preference 
and expected  cost  change will destabilize inflation.  The current inflation  is 
dominated by  the long-term expectations for future inflation.  Consequently, 
the interest rates should be set as to yield zero inflation on the average in the 
long run.  This also means that the central bank must on average relate the 
nominal interest rate to the expected  next-period cost  shock, -partS1,  and 
steady-state interest rate, log 6 +  v. 
The  last  term,  (6Xp)T+1Et  Apt+T+l,  which  represents  the  aggregated 
transversality condition (23) of  inflationmust be zero.  The first partial sum 
in the braces, which describes the expected future, up to period T, is in gen- 
eral bounded only with finite T. The discount factor, (6Xp)jXp -  A;j(6AP)-', 
is  greater than unity  and thus restricts the speed of  mean reversion of the 
linear combination of  interest rates and cost  changes.  For  certain paths of 
zt  EE it+j + log6 + v +  the first term will be bounded even in the 
limiting case as T approaches infinity. The second partial sum represents the 
expectations from the period T + 1 onwards.  Its discount factor is less than 
unity but the expectation term is multiplied by  a factor that is greater than 
unity and raised to the power T + 1. This puts restrictions on the very distant 
path of  process zt and it must approach zero as T approaches infinity. 
Note that in the above equilibria, the greater the cost of  changing prices, d, 
the less the influence of  monetary policy (ie the interest rate) on the inflation. 
This is due to the rigidity of  changing prices.  In this sense, the model is not 
very classical in the short run. The price rigidity is exogenous with respect to 
monetary policy and with respect to the level of  inflation. This is probably an 
unrealistic assumption for a high inflation regime.  In the more realistic case, 
the adjustment cost would be linked to the level of  inflation. King and Wolman 
(1996) discuss this possibility in the context of  the Calvo's price setting. Finally, the solution for money growth is given by  the following equation: 
where  /A,[  > 1  is one of  the roots of  1  + I + $  =  X + f . Money growth does 
not have any feedback to the solutions for inflation and consumption growth. 
Consequently, it does not have any role in an inflation targeting monetary pol- 
icy using an interest rate instrument.  Equilibrium is determined by  expected 
future interest rates, cost shocks and velocity shocks. The existence of  velocity 
shocks adds an extra complication to monetary targeting.  The central bank 
will need to know the stochastic characteristics of  the velocity shocks. 
3  Inflation  Targeting  and  Monetary  Policy 
Strategy 
Our  model describes the dynamic relationship between money, prices,  con- 
sumption and interest rates. The model includes two types of  exogenous shock: 
a preference shock in the money-in-the-utility-function and an aggregate cost 
shock to production.  So far we  have treated interest rates as being predeter- 
mined, ie we  have analysed the equilibria given an exogenous path of  expected 
interest rates. In this section we  give a more profound characterization of  the 
equilibrium. In section 3.1 we  characterize the possible interest rate path given 
the preference for finite inflation. Section 3.2 gives more precision to concept of 
inflation targeting. We compare direct inflation targeting to inflation-expecta- 
tions targeting. Then in section 3.3 we  utilize the Euler equation for money to 
study the equilibrium, where inflation is determined by current money growth 
and lagged other variables. 
The model has interesting implications for monetary policy strategy.  In- 
flation  (see equation  (36)) is determined  by  the discounted  sum of  expected 
future interest rates and discounted expected future cost changes.  If  interest 
rates are controllable by  the central bank1',  there is a direct channel from the 
monetary policy instrument to inflation. 
llMost of  the central banks do control the short-term interest rates: two weeks rep0 rate The equilibrium inflation is  characterized by  knife-edge dynamics:  if ex- 
pected interest rates and cost changes diverge by  too much for too long from 
each other and from the steady-state interest rate, the result will be destabiliz- 
ing inflation. The equilibrium exhibits the kind of behaviour which was studied 
by  Knut Wicksell already in the early part of  the century (see Wicksell 1936). 
Since the discount  factor for  the forward  sum is  greater than unity,  it de- 
termines the speed at which the linear combination of  interest  rate and cost 
change converges to zero.  We  discuss the feasibility of  interest rate paths in 
section 3.1. 
We extend the analysis to the case where the central bank aims to stabilize 
inflation or inflation expectations.  In the former case inflation is fixed at the 
target rate, whereas in the latter case shocks cause inflation to diverge from 
the targeted rate. The differences are due to information differences between 
households and firms versus the central bank.  The central bank must make the 
first move. Different cases arise depending on whether nature moves before or 
after the central bank, ie whether the shocks occur before or after the central 
bank moves.  We  compare these rules to the classical case in which interest 
rates are conditioned on current inflation.  It turns out that the classical case 
does not necessarily lead to a constant inflation rate, whereas the other rules 
do. 
Finally we are able to show that money has a particular feature in our setup. 
Because of  the adjustment costs on money balances, we  find an equilibrium 
where money can be used  as an anchoring device for inflation.  The central 
bank can even use a money rule whereby money growth is conditioned on the 
period t -  1 information of  the state variables.  This gives the central bank 
a device for controling inflation with a lagged information set.  However, the 
central bank needs to know the parameters of  the 'money demand' equation. 
3.1  Feasible Interest Rate Paths 
In.  this section we  discuss the possible interest rate paths for given stochastic 
specification of  the cost process, given the aim of  finite inflation.  We  discuss 
first some general results and then the restrictions on the interest rate process 
for the case in which the expected cost change is constant. 
The forward solution (36) can be written as 
Since 16Apl > 1 and  J1/XpJ < 1, the discount factor, (6Ap)j - (k)',  is greater 
than one. The discount factor restricts the feasible path of  the interest rate and 
cost  growth processes.  Assuming an autoregressive process for the weighted 
sum of  the interest rate and cost change processes zt  = it +  log 6 +  v +  pArt+l, 
ie  a(L)zt = E,Z  (where  E,Z  is identically and indepently distributed with zero 
mean) we  can prove the following proposition: 
(the Bundesbank, the Swedish Riksbank), one month tender rate (the Bank of  Finland), 
FED funds rate (Federal Reserve), etc. 
22 Proposition 1.  Assuming that xt = it +  log 6 +  v +  follows an autore- 
gressive process a(L)xt =  E,Z  with E,Z  independently and identically distributed 
with mean zero, inflation will be finite if the absolute value roots of  la(L)I = 0 
are greater than 6Ap.  ."  ,  ., 
The proof  follows from the discount term, which is at most of  the order 
6Ap.  However in general there is no need to be restricted to the class of  linear 
interest rate processes. 
The proposition is  not readily applicable and does not lead to uncondi- 
tional12 interest  rate rules  unless  we  parameterize  the process  driving  cost 
changes.  It asserts that the expected cost change (which could be negative on 
the average) and interest rate should not diverge but should instead converge 
at least with a the rate that is limited by  the 1/6Ap.  The absolute require- 
ment for inflation-stabilizing monetary policy, given the cost-change process, 
is to choose the parameters of  the interest rate process so that they satisfy the 
condition in proposition 1. Hence, by the very nature of rational expectations, 
the policy is a sequence of  the relevant control variable -  not a single point 
at a single point of  time. Accordingly, the policy is generally not defined by a 
single point for the interest rate but rather by the parameters of  the interest 
rate process.  If  the monetary policy is aimed at stabilizing inflation, policy- 
makers must choose the parameters of  the interest rate process according to 
proposition 1. Consequently the parameters of  the interest rate process depend 
on the parameters of  the cost change process. 
Consider, for example, tge case where EtArt+1 = r* and xt  is assumed to 
follow an AR(1) process 
it = -(log6 +  v) -  p~*  + ~(i~-~  + log6 +  v +  pr*) +  E:, 
where E!  is a zero-mean independent process13. The j  period conditional fore- 
cast is then Etit+j  = $(it +  log 6 +  v +  pr*). The expectation part of  equation 
(38) is then Et  x,",,[(6Ap)j  -  (l/A,)j]d (it + log 6 +  v + +pi*), which is finite 
if  ILI  < 1/6Ap.  Monetary policy  in a world of  constant  cost growth is fairly 
simple.  In order to keep inflation bounded, the central bank must choose the 
parameters of  the interest rate process so that its degree of  mean reversion is 
strong enough.  The central bank need not to react to innovations in costs. 
All it must do is to fix the parameters of  the interest rate process so that they 
satisfy the condition of proposition 1. In the above AR(1) example, the change 
in policy implies a different choice of  L. 
In  the general  case, where  the expected cost  change is  not  a  constant, 
monetary policy  must react to innovations  in the expected growth  rate for 
costs but not to innovations in the level for costs. Due to this fact the interest 
rates must be changed for every period when a shock occurs to the growth rate 
of Art. However, a change in the interest rates is not a monetary policy change 
since it is the parameters of  the interest rate process that define the monetary 
policy.  It is also implicitly assumed that the central bank can commit itself to 
an interest rate rule. 
'%y  the term unconditional  rule we  mean a rule that is independent of  the state of  the 
economy, eg a constant money growth rules. 
13We need not assume homoscedasticity.  Note that it is not necessary to define the policy 
shocks, ~f. 3.2  Targeting Inflation or Inflation Expectations 
In this section we study three cases. In the first case the central bank (monetary 
authority) targets a constant inflation rate, Apt =  n*.  This leads to a sufficient 
condition for determining the interest rate rule.  The policy rule that results 
is optimal in the case where the central bank has a direct inflation target and 
a quadratic objective function with respect to the deviations of  inflation from 
the target.  The second  case assumes  that in each period the central bank 
must set the interest rate path before the cost and velocity shocks occur, ie 
such shocks are not known by the central bank when it makes its interest rate 
decision.  Svensson (1996) refers this as inflation forecast targeting, Et-  Apt = 
n*.  Finally we investigate the pure feedback rule proposed by  Kerr and King 
(1996), where the interest rates are set on the basis of  feedback from current 
inflation. 
To fix inflation at a given rate, we  replace the actual inflation in equation 
(38) with targeted inflation, n*, and solve for the current interest rate: 
According to the resulting interest rate rule, the interest rate should be set in 
line with the expected cost change and targeted inflation rate, n*.  In addition 
to this the central bank ties its hands for the future by announcing the interest 
rate path that is in line with targeted inflation.  The convergence results hold 
for this infinite sum as in section 3.1. 
The central bank could eg in the case of  expected falling costs announce 
that in order to reach the targeted inflation today it will raise interest rates 
only in the future. It could even lower the current interest rates today if it can 
commit to raising them in the future. By means of  such an announcement, it 
could not only postpone the interest rate change but also achieve inflation of 
n*.  However, this policy cannot be pursued forever because the transversality 
condition (23) restricts the possibility of  postponing the decision.  In general, 
the model allows the central bank to choose any kind of  inflation path (within 
the limits of  the transversality condition) by  announcing a  suitable interest 
rate path with respect to expected cost changes. 
A sufficient  condition for achieving the targeted inflation, n*,  can be ob- 
tained by  replacing the expected and actual inflation rates in Euler equation 
(34) by targeted inflation rate n*, and solving for the current interest rate. We 
obtain the following interest rate rule: 
it =  n* -  (log 6 +  v) -  pEtArt+1.  (40) 
The outcome of  the inflation targeting policy is that the central bank must 
set the interest rate according to expected  cost  change and inflation target 
minus the steady state interest rate in order to keep inflation at the targeted 
rate, n*.  If  we  assume a constant cost growth of  T*, the constant interest rate it = IT* -  (log6 + v) -  pr* stabilizes inflation at IT*. This however is not the 
case when the cost process is not a martingale with drift. 
We consider the following example, where the cost change follows the first 
order autoregressive process Art = ,DArt-,  +  E;.  -The interest rate rule is Ahen 
it = IT* -  (log6 + v) -  p,DArt.  Hence, the interest rates vary over time as 
the cost changes vary.  It is also clear that there must not be any parameter 
uncertainty, ie the cost change process must be known.  Note that the above 
discussion  on  shocks also applies here.  The central bank need  not react  to 
shocks to the level of  costs if  these do not change the growth rate for costs. 
We  resuffle  the sequence  of  decisions  by  assuming that the interest rate 
is  set before the current cost  and velocity  shocks take place.  Consequently, 
the interest  rate can be conditioned on period t -  1 information only.  The 
conditional interest rate rule can be obtained from (40) as 
&-lit =  n* -  (log S +  v) -  PE~-~AT~+~.  (41) 
We note that here the central bank must forecast even the current cost change. 
The realization of  the period t cost change may deviate from the expected one 
and thus the current inflation may differ from IT*.  We denote the update of  the 
cost change expectations as cf7 = EtArt+1  -Et-lArt+l.  Since the central bank 
cannot know the shocks for period t,  it cannot directly control the inflation. 
Inflation is  then determined by  the target  and the expectations update, ie 
Apt =  IT*  +  E?. 
We  may  interprete the above  equation as the optimal rule under  strict 
inflation targeting when  the central bank  uses  the inflation  forecast  as the 
intermediate target (see Svensson 1996). Households and firms know the value 
of  current costs when they make their decisions on money, consumption and 
prices.  Consequently they do not make mistakes in setting the current inflation. 
Given the above example, where cost change follows a first-order autoregressive 
process, we note that the central bank observes the interest rate rule Et-1it = 
n* -  (log6 + v) -  p,D2Art-1.  In such an autoregressive case, it can replace 
the period t -  1 cost  change with that period's inflation.  The rule Et-lit = 
IT*  -  (log S +  v) -  ~,D(AP~-~  -  n*) -  p,B3Art-2 is equivalent with the above rule. 
When we iterate the rule backwards, we  end up with the following distributed 
lag version of  the rule: 
Et-lit =  71* -  (log S +  v) -  p  ,Dj(Apt+ -  IT*) 
j= 1 
= (1 -  P)n* -  (1 -  p)  (log 6 +  v) -  ,Dp(Apt-1 -  IT*)  +  PEt-zit-1.  (42) 
Hence, the central bank can condition the current interest rate on the whole 
inflation history instead of  on the expected cost change. Another interpretation 
is  that setting of  the current interest  rate must  be conditioned on the last 
deviation from target and the last interest  rate setting.  This is  due to the 
autoregressive cost change process  and is not a  general result.  Also  in this 
particular case the cost process parameters (here P) must be known. 
The first interest rate rule (40) is designed to imply a fixed inflation rate. 
However, there is nothing in rule (41) that guarantees the finiteness of  current inflation. Using the definition of  tfT  we  can manipnlate the rille to get, 
zt  = Et-lit + pEt--lA~t+l  =  K*  -  (log6 + v)  + pt,a'. 
According to proposition (1)  the rule guarantees finite current inflation only if 
the expectation revisions are sufficiently mean-reverting.  Although this is the 
case in a rational expectations framework, it might not be the case in certain 
adaptive expectations schemes. 
Third, we consider the following situation wherein the central bank operates 
a feedback rule of  the form 
it = i+g(Apt -T*),  where g > 0.  (43) 
This rule is analyzed  eg by  Parkin  (1978), McCallum  (1981) and Kerr and 
King (1996). We append this 'nominal anchor' to the equilibrium relationship 
(38). The result is that Euler equation (34) reduces to 
1 
.An+.  -  (1  +  + )  tt+  + (  j  + gg)  Apt = 
It can be shown that the roots of  the characteristic polynomial  of  Euler 
equation  (44) are both greater  than unity  if  g  > 1 and both sides  of the 
unit circle if  0 < g  < 1.  When g  > 1, the central bank reacts forcefully  to 
deviations of  inflation from target. In this case the inflation is bounded if  the 
cost changes are bounded.  Without the costs, this is same result as in Kerr 
and King (1996). What differs is the fact that the exact inflation target  can 
be achieved with this rule only in the case  where the expected  cost  changes are 
constant.  From the above, it follows that the central bank must explicitely 
take into account  the expected cost  change in deciding on the interest rate 
rule.  With an autoregressive cost process, the central bank can condition the 
interest rate on past inflation but it must also condition the interest rate on 
past cost changes.  There is no escape from conditioning the interest rate rule 
on cost information.  Our result is very much like deriving from the analysis 
by Ireland (1997). 
3.3  Money as Nominal Anchor 
In this section we  explore the case where the central bank uses  money as a 
nominal anchor.  Money has a special role in our framework.  We  show how 
money  replaces the expectations as to future technology  shocks and discuss 
how the central bank can use the current  growth  of  nominal balances  as a 
monetary policy  instrument.  Since money  growth incorporates the above- 
mentioned expectations, it follows that money can be a robust monetary policy 
instrument. 
We solve for consumption from the Euler equation for prices (29) and sub- 
stitute it into the Euler equation for money (27). We end up with the following stochastic difference equation: 
DnM  +  -1  - (1 +I  + $)  + IL] &mi 
Note that 11/61 > 1. This equation has the following interesting deterministic 
backward solution: 
DnM  DnMI  + -Amt  + 
dSpz  dSpi  Amt- 1 
The coefficient of current money changes determines the positive relationship 
between money  growth and inflation.  This relationship enables  the control 
of  inflation by  controlling money growth.  The sign of  the loading coefficient, 
--  DW  motivates the results for the estimation of  the money demand system, 
d6p ' 
as in Ericsson and Sharma (1996). 
Another line of interpretation of  the relationship is that money serves as 
an important information variable on inflation. It replaces the discounted sum 
of expected interest rates and expected future cost changes. Consequently, the 
relationship is also usefu to a central bank with an interest rate instrument 
and a direct inflation target.  In fact, if  the central bank is uncertain about 
the precise parameterization of  the stochastic process for cost change or there 
is simply a great deal of  uncertainty as to future cost  shocks, the bank can 
use money as an indicator of  public expectations as to future cost changes and 
interest rates. 
This particular contemporaneous relationship arises from the adjustment 
costs of  changing money  holdings.  In  the case of  zero  adjustment  costs  of 
money  (K = O),  the money growth  terms vanish and the equation contains 
only lagged inflation and the error correction term, ie the last term in paren- 
theses.  In such a case the inflation could not  directly be controlled by  the 
money instrument.  Hence the contemporaneus relationship between inflation 
and money growth is a unique feature of  the model at hand, not a feature of 
the MIUF model in general. 
Replacing current inflation, Apt, with targeted inflation, T*, we  obtain the 
following money growth rule: 
DnM  dpi 
-  DKM  m*  ST*  - -  )  DKM 
Apt-1 +  IAmt-1 
We  see that the central bank  can precisely  determine the period t inflation 
rate by  relying solely on information known at the end of  period t -  1. Only the period t -  1 realizations of  rt-1 and  need to be known.  One need not 
to know the stochastic specification of  the shocks.  Hence, the money rule of 
equation (46) is robust with respect to the stochastic processes for rt  and (t. 
The central bank can control inflation exactly even *if the money supply 4s set 
at the start of  period t, ie before period t shocks occur. 
There is no free lunch here either: equation (45) can be utilized only in the 
case where the parameters of  the relationship (27) are known.  The parameters 
that must be known, in addition to the parameters in the interest rate rules, 
are the level of  adjustment costs, KM,  the mean of  steady state, m*, and the 
linearization point of  interest rate, i. 
The form of  the relationship  described by  equation (46) is, in a sense,  a 
formulation of  the Bundesbank approach14. The German Bundesbank sets its 
money  growth target as the sum of  growth rates (targets) for prices, veloc- 
ity and potential output. Here &it -  ;ct  presents the velocity term, which is 
partly independent of monetary policy and depends on the time-varying liquid- 
ity services that money provides; negative changes in irt  represent  advances 
in potential output.  The relationship between  real money balances, interest 
rates, and preference and technology  shocks represents the steady state rela- 
tionship to which the system converges.  The rest of  the equation represent the 
adjustment dynamics for inflation and money. 
Demand for Money and Monetary Policy 
We conclude the study by  discussing the role of  the demand for money in a 
monetary policy framework wherein the central bank has an inflation target. 
To some extent, this discussion is connected with the discussion on the choice 
of  monetary policy instrument initiated by Poole (1970). 
Our model  is  based  on  the money-in-the-utility-function  approach aug- 
mented with a  sticky price  supply side equation.  The special characteristic 
of  the model is the adjustment costs of  money balances. The driving forces of 
the system arise from the aggregate cost shocks as well as from the shocks to 
preferences regarding real money balances.  The Euler equation for money de- 
termines either money balances or interest rates.  Consumption is determined 
by  the Euler equation for bonds.  Finally, the adjustment costs for changing 
prices lead to the Euler equation for inflation. 
The equilibria determined by the last two Euler equations fully characterize 
the relationship between  inflation and interest rates given the expected cost 
change.  In this respect, money is not needed in the model in order to control 
inflation. In such a case, the first Euler equation simply determines the money 
holdings.  An interest rate rule that targets constant inflation or inflation ex- 
pectations must be conditioned on the expected cost  change.  This is one of 
the main findings of  the study. In the more realistic situation when the shocks 
for period t are not known by  the central bank, the inflation cannot be tar- 
geted at all. In that case only the inflation expectations can be targeted. The 
only exception is the most simplistic case wherein the cost change is constant 
over time.  However, in general, precise estimation of  the cost process may be 
'*See  eg Deutsche Bundesbank (1997) or any other January issue of  its monthly report. impossible or at least very difficult, and stability of  the technology  process is 
a very heroic assumption. In such a case the inflation targeting rule cannot be 
found. One can say in summary that it is possible to reach the inflation target 
using the interest rate instrument only if  the cost process is known.. 
We also show that in the case of adjustment costs for nominal money bal- 
ances there exists an equilibrium in which current money growth determines 
current inflation.  This is also the outcome in the models with no friction in 
prices or money.  However, this classical result is not generally present in sticky 
price models.  The introduction of  adjustment costs in changing money hold- 
ings leads to this result in our setup. Monetary policy can be based on money 
as an instrument or money as an intermediate target. This approach is robust 
in two respects:  First, the proposed money rule is based only on the informa- 
tion of period t -  l. Hence, the rule is robust to any choice of  the ordering of 
actions. Second, no information is needed on the stochastic process governing 
cost changes or velocity changes.  This robustness relieves the central bank of 
the task of  estimating the cost change process.  The cost of  using money as an 
information variable for expected cost changes and expected interest rates is 
that the some additional parameters must be known.  These parameters are re- 
lated to the 'money demand' parameters.  We should emphasize that this kind 
of equilibrium exists only because of  adjustment costs and it is not a general 
feature of  a dynamic stochastic money-in-the-utility-function model combined 
with sticky prices. 
Although central banks cannot possibly precisely  control a wide monetary 
aggregate, they can easily  control the monetary base15.  It has been argued 
(see eg Goodhart 1994) that even controlling the monetary base is not only 
undesirable but also infeasible.  The reason for this is the resulting increased 
volatility of interest rates. However, this is not a problem for central banks that 
use averaging of  the required reserves.  McCallum (1997) argues that 'neither 
interest rate nor monetary base instruments are infeasible,' and concludes that 
it is a question of  desirability. 
Our model exhibits the basic insight of Poole (1970): If  there is uncertainty 
about the parameters of  the 'money demand' function (money demand shocks 
in  Poole's terminology), the interest  rate is suitable as the monetary policy 
instrument. On the other hand, if productivity shocks occur or -  in our setup 
-  the parameters of the cost changes are not known, nominal money balances 
are a  suitable monetary policy instrument.  In this sense,  our model shifts 
Poole's analysis from shocks to parameter uncertainty. 
It is  clear that the tradeoff  between these two instrument choices is the 
parameter uncertainty concerning 'money demand', on the one hand, and pa- 
rameter uncertainty  concerning cost  process, on the other hand.  The third 
dimension is the issue of  whether  current or expected inflation is to be tar- 
geted -  ultimately this is the issue of  ordering decisions in our economy.  It is 
clear that the choice of  a monetary policy instrument is very much an empirical 
and economy-specific question. 
15~he  money measure is not however restricted in this study. References 
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